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Abstract 
 
The aim of this article is to sketch the procedural nature of the modus in 
which  Deleuze  reads  the  other  philosophers.  The  hermeneutical  problem 
indicated by the indecision to consider his books on different authors as an 
authorized interpretation or as fantasist utilization may be scattered if we 
understand  his  hermeneutical  attempts  both  as  interpretation  and 
construction (concept or problem). In addition, this indecision affects the guild 
of Deleuzian exegetes in respect to the directory idea (prime author) which 
could point out the general strategy of his philosophy. 
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I believe it is relevant to describe Deleuze’s ‘interpretive 
method’ in a plural manifestation form because its denomination 
in singular ought to include a complex web of positions regarding 
the problems arising from the preparation, conduct and waging of 
a ‘guerilla war’ within and with philosophy. This is the reason why 
I  have  selected  Hume,  Nietzsche,  Kant  and  Bergson  from  his 
works (written in his early period), the elements that enable the 
realization of a sketch of his ‘method’. 
How  can  one  explain  Gilles  Deleuze’s  philosophical 
initiative?  How  can  it  be  explained  taking  into  account  the 
polymorphous nature resulting from its ambiguous relation with 
the ‘academia’? Will we find an answer in case we discover what 
his philosophy aims to overcome, accomplish, oppose, or, to put it Emilian Mărgărit / A Sketch of Deleuze’s Hermeneutical Spin 
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more  simply,  in  case  we  discover  who  or  what  does  he  write 
against? 
If  we  analyze  procedurally  the  implications  of  Deleuze’s 
philosophy, we can state in principle that: a) his philosophy is not 
an  unknown  fruit  (as  one  could  think  taking  into  account  the 
famous exotic titles, especially in the English speaking regions, 
that announce an exegesis on Deleuze) that emerged accidentally 
from the old tree of Western philosophy and that b) his genuine 
concepts  are  also  pro/ble/gram/matic  reactions  to  the  above 
mentioned tradition. 
Vincent Descombes, one of the authors who attempted to 
outline the complex situation of the ‘60s atmosphere in France, 
exemplifies the subjectivity as main thread. It is a main thread to 
the  extent  that  subjectivity  faced  a  dual  attack:  a)  against  the 
idealist premises of phenomenology in search of a ‘genuine’ cogito, 
thus  maintaining  the  subject  as  a  principle,  and  b)  against 
dialectics seen  as pivoting  around ‘a higher concept of identity’ 
(Descombes 1980, 76). We may relate Deleuze to these combatant 
attitudes  if  we  widen  the  meaning  presupposed  by  subjectivity 
and the horizon of its justifiability, if we take into account the 
‘flank’  it  opens  up  in  relation  to:  “(…)  the  critique  or 
deconstruction of interiority, of self-presence, of consciousness, of 
mastery,  of  the  individual  or  collective  property  of  an  essence. 
Critique or deconstruction of the firmness of a seat (hypokeimenon, 
substantia,  subjectum)  and  the  certitude  of  an  authority  and  a 
value (the individual, a people, the state, history, work).” (Nancy 
1991, 4) 
However, from this perspective only, we observe a purely 
reactive  reactionary  presence  in  Deleuzes’s  case.  Does  his 
philosophy coagulates only and to the extent that it is a choleric 
reaction to the classical themes of philosophy, just like the light of 
a bulb only draws out and gathers the insects wandering in the 
dark? It is not by chance (but not undisputable) that the exegesis 
in the field suggests as direction vectors of Deleuze’s philosophy 
authors that he approached. In this sense, Bergson, Nietzsche and 
Spinoza  are  linked  in  various  ways  in  order  to  explain  the 
Deleuzian  project.  Here  are  some  examples  taken  from  the 
literature in the field to support this argument. META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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For  instance,  Badiou  believes  that  Bergson  is  the  true 
inspiration of Deleuze’s thinking (the idealism of his philosophy) 
(Badiou  1999,  39);  in  the  same  spirit,  Keith  Ansell  Pearson 
believes that Deleuze’s ontology owes everything to Bergson and 
that the reading of Spinoza bears a Bergsonian influence (Pearson 
1999,  12).  According  to  Constantin  V.  Boundas,  the 
transcendental  empiricism  of  Deleuze  is  Bergson-inspired 
(Boundas 2006, 11). Michael Hardt divided Deleuze’s philosophy 
into  a  Bergson-inspired  ontology,  an  ethics  supported  by 
Nietzsche’s  philosophy  and  a  ‘politics’  supported  by  a  collective 
model of Spinoza-inspired ethical practice. According to Hardt, the 
Deleuzian  reading  of  Spinoza  has  Bergsonian  and  Nietzschean 
characteristics,  and  the  successive  reading  of  these  authors 
ensured Deleuze with the anti-Hegelian project of his philosophy 
(Hardt 1993, X–XII). Todd May states that there is a ‘holy Trinity’ 
of Deleuze’s philosophy where: Spinoza is the Son, Bergson is the 
Father and Nietzsche is the Holy Spirit. In the same line, at the 
‘individual  all-round’  section,  Spinoza  and  Bergson  make  up 
Deleuze’s  ontology  with  the  immanence  and  duration  concepts. 
Also, Nietzsche holds the affirmative flag of a subversive ethics 
(May 2005, 25–27). In contrast (as an exotic contrasting example), 
Manuel Delanda relates his philosophy to the scientific discourse 
because he takes Deleuze as a procesualist thinker (Delanda 2002, 
14–16). 
We might think that the reason why the authors wooed by 
Deleuze are suggested as directions of his thinking consists in the 
fact  that  each  of  them  is  a  counterpoint  to  the  mainstream 
philosophy: Spinoza to the rationalists and theology; Nietzsche to 
the philosophy at large, it seems, seen as Platonic metaphysics; 
Bergson  to  Kant,  Hegel  or,  generally  speaking,  to  the  way 
philosophical problems are constructed. In the scenarios described 
by  the  above  mentioned  writers,  Deleuze  appears  to  suggest 
himself  as  a  spearhead  for  an  already  existing  aggressive 
direction.  However,  it  is  imperative  that  we  do  not  forget  that 
Deleuze’s  way  of  reading  singles  out  an  author  and  somehow 
takes  him  outside  an  official  tradition.  Can  it  be  stated  that 
Deleuze has ‘built’ himself a tradition or is it possible that the 
selection of authors, the electivity lying at the basis of their exotic Emilian Mărgărit / A Sketch of Deleuze’s Hermeneutical Spin 
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cohabitation within a ‘tradition’ is proof of a taste for ‘scandal’ in 
philosophy? 
I  suggest  that  we  discover  the  method  of  the  Deleuzian 
reading by following the course of his first books and especially his 
very first book on Hume’s philosophy, which is unjustly absent 
from the exegesis on the matter. 
(a)  Although  it  is  not  the  main  object  of  his  first  work, 
Deleuze puts into question the way one can tell which manner of 
reading  is  better  than  another.  In  Deleuze’s  view,  to  position 
oneself  to  a  text  is  to  detect  the  problem  that  makes  up  the 
foundation and the structure of a theory, that is to understand 
and  question  not  the  solution  to  a  problem  but  the  very 
interrogation  that  rephrases  a  certain  type  of  experience, 
presupposing other connections, other differentiation relations, a 
new way of forcing things out, etc. (a surprisingly recurring theme 
forty years later in What is philosophy?). Therefore, to criticize is 
to detect a ‘force deficit’, a too mainstream way of thematizing the 
basic data of an experience, the insufficiency of a differentiation, 
the commonplaceness of a comment in relation to the experience 
of a problem through an author.  “To put something in question 
means  subordinating  and  subjecting  things  to  the  question, 
intending, through this constrained and forced subsumption, that 
they reveal an essence or a nature. To criticize the question means 
showing  under  what  conditions  the  question  is  possible  and 
correctly raised; in other words, how things would not be what 
they  are  were  the  question  different  from  the  one  formulated.” 
(Deleuze 1991, 106) 
This is the reason why the Deleuzian transcription of the 
problematics of Hume’s empiricism starts with the interrogation 
of the nature of subjectivity: is it not that the subject constitutes 
itself  within  the  given?  And  the  condition  of  possibility,  the 
playground of this interrogation is given by the phrase ‘relations 
are  external  to  ideas’  (Deleuze  1991,  24,  119).  The  Deleuzian 
empiricism takes on a type of reading that engages the history of 
philosophy through the problematics that break up the continuous 
aspect  of  its  history;  this  reading  frames  an  author  with  a 
constant view to the position of a precise problem – such as that of 
the  subject  –  and  to  the  presentation  of  the  conditions  of  this 
problem. Thus, it is understood that to Deleuze the fidelity of a META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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reading per se limits itself to the maintaining of the problematic 
field, where the problematic field is the univocal relation described 
(rhizomatically) as the coupling of the problem to its emergence 
conditions. Therefore, the relation between Hume, his work and 
Deleuze’s  position  towards  it  focus  on  the  same  fact  when  the 
consistency of the reading is in view and not so much its justness. 
The  psychological  or  social  factors  can  be  conceived  of  as  color 
enhancers  of  the  problematics,  that  is  they  express  the  set  of 
motivations and do not induce the degree of truth nor the degree 
of falseness of the question. ‘Hume’ is simply the nominal owner of 
a problematic field. In a pragmatist way similar to a certain point 
with Richard Rorty, Deleuze can tell us that the importance of an 
author disappears or  holds depending on the  problematics that 
can recreate him (Alliez 2004, 33). 
However,  the  generally  defining  aspect  of  the  Deleuzian 
reading strategy is the fact that to interpret is to simultaneously 
construct, and the two generate the true unity of a creation if, of 
course, the creation makes current a certain problematics. “(…) to 
see the history of philosophy as a sort of buggery or (it comes to 
the same thing) immaculate conception. I saw myself as taking an 
author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own 
offspring, yet monstrous. It was really important for it to be his 
own child, because the author had to actually say all I had him 
saying. But the child was bound to be monstrous too, because it 
resulted  from  all  sorts  of  shifting,  slipping,  dislocations,  and 
hidden emissions that I really enjoyed.” (Deleuze 1995, 6) 
In  other  words,  the  Deleuzian  reading  way  must  be 
simultaneously understood as interpretation and construction of 
concept – a procreating ‘sodomizing’ as Deleuze himself calls it. A 
procedural  division  of  this  hermeneutic  couple  distinguishes  on 
the one hand, in the case of the work on Hume, constructivism1 as 
an immanent manner of restitution of the conceptual stake of an 
author, emphasizing the play of the structural elements, and on 
the  other  hand,  an  assembly  and  deconstruction  strategy 
regarding mainly authors and their ‘isms’, concepts, distinctions 
pertaining to the official history of philosophy and that may be 
included generically under the label interpretation. Interpretation 
plays a minimal role in the assembly of the contrast elements (for 
instance, Hume – Bergson, Nietzsche – Freud), but a decisive one Emilian Mărgărit / A Sketch of Deleuze’s Hermeneutical Spin 
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when  the  problematics  in  question  has  a  certain  shape  and 
conflicting determination in connection to a tradition or an event-
author  (Kant  in  this  case).  To  be  more  precise,  in  the  book  in 
question, Deleuze inaugurates the relation Hume – Kant on the 
subject issue. This relation does not presuppose the reiteration of 
the  historical  sequence  Hume  –  Kant  in  order  to  discover  the 
difficulties that the former could not overcome in connection with 
the latter, nor to evaluate the epistemological solfeggio sung by 
Kant in order to dissipate the atonal skepticism of Hume. In the 
case of the problematics assumed by Deleuze, the reiteration of 
this  sequence  is  decisive  for  the  way  in  which,  starting  from 
Hume’s philosophy, a theory of subjectivity can be grounded in its 
practical origins, as well as, of course, its conflicting relation with 
the Kantian transcendental theory. 
Formally, the two movements that describe the physics of 
the Deleusian problematic moves in the case of Hume’s philosophy 
can  be  extended  by  suggesting  generically  and  unitarily  a  new 
way of working in philosophy, and particularly in the case of each 
book  (Nietzsche,  Bergson,  Kant,  Proust,  Sacher-Masoch):  a)  an 
immanent reading that goes through and connects the basic data 
of  a  certain  problematics;  b)  a  critical,  sometimes  de/re-
constructive  review  or  infusion  of  certain  concepts,  distinctions, 
major philosophical theses. 
(b)  Deleuze’s  book  on  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  is  multiply 
relevant. Its importance can be biographically determined2; it is 
also decisively relevant to the first hand exegesis on Nietzsche. 
And not least, at the conceptual level, disregarding the other two 
relevant  points,  there  is  a  problematics  determined  by  the 
certification of a ‘radical empiricism’ and a ‘nihilist dialectics’. We 
can  configure  and  procedurally  separate  the  construction  and 
interpretation elements in order to detect the relation Deleuze – 
Nietzsche in his aggressive trial against philosophy the same way 
we  described  Deleuze’s  reading  on  Hume.  “The  philosophical 
learning of an author is not assessed by numbers of quotations, 
nor by the always fanciful and conjectural check lists of libraries, 
but by the apologetic or polemical directions of his work itself. We 
will misunderstand the whole of Nietzsche's work if we do not see 
"against  whom"  its  principle  concepts  are  directed.  Hegelian META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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themes are present in this work as the enemy against which it 
fights.” (Deleuze 2002, 162) 
Let  us  imagine  Deleuze’s  book  like  a  battlefield  within 
philosophy;  his  strategy  must  be  deduced  from  the  concrete 
movement of concepts, in connection with the enemy he encircles 
or carefully studies. The movements per se of a concept depending 
on its operative enemy, the encirclement, the jumble, the constant 
fight are the signs of what we called constructivism. The strategy 
of  scrapping,  assembly,  local  coherence  and  interdependence 
inferred  from  these  movements  bears  the  generic  title  of 
interpretation.3 
(c) Deleuze’s work on Kant is a source of perplexity for the 
readers accustomed to his ‘hallucinative’ reading method. There is 
no  ‘problematic  staging’,  no  confronted  positions,  and  no 
discussion about a possible lack: one is simply confronting some 
subtle notes depicting the cobweb of Kantian critical philosophy, 
put down with the thoroughness of an inquirer. In this sense, one 
of  Deleuze’s  commentators  has  a  synthetic  view  on  the 
hermeneutical  scenarios  displayed  by  Deleuze  in  his  books, 
drawing  them  closer  to  the  detective  novel  build-up  manner: 
“Philosophy is a detective story to the extent that we start not 
from the knowledge or assumptions, but from the clues, disparate 
elements,  combined  later  in  a  virtual  world  whose  only 
consistency  is  the  internal  consistency  of  a  possible  model.” 
(Antonioli 1999, 15) 
In comparison to the method I suggest, consisting in the 
definition  of  the  Deleuzian  reading  strategy  simultaneously  as 
concept  interpretation  and  construction,  the  narrative  premise 
risks engaging and wasting the Deleuzian philosophy between the 
folds of an excessive and dominant pragmatist hermeneutics. The 
investigation  of  the  inquirer  assembles  the  clues  in  a  montage 
and, secondly, in a coherent virtual scenario through the network 
of signs intersection and sending. The fact that the montage does 
not  represent  the  ‘in-self’  of  an  author  does  not  reduce  the 
Deleuzian procedure to a merely narrative method. Moreover, the 
montage procedure is energized by a collage method4 that settles 
in conceptual constructions the clues of a level, placing it into the 
multiple and transversal network of the other levels that make up 
the work of an author; this takes place in various opposition or Emilian Mărgărit / A Sketch of Deleuze’s Hermeneutical Spin 
457 
 
 
alliance scenarios, within an unconventional or elective history of 
philosophy  (Hume  deconstructs  the  transcendental  unity  of  the 
subject, Nietzsche completes the Kantian critique, Hume’s link to 
Nietzsche concerning the exteriority of relations, the manner in 
which something can be thought, etc.). What is more, the authors 
who  have  a  stand  at  the  level  of  the  various  problematic 
representations are distributed differently5 (the Hume in his first 
book is different from the Hume in Difference and Repetition), in 
main or secondary roles (Bergson in Difference and Repetition in 
relation to Logic of Sense), a neuter tone (the book on Kant) or a 
negative  tone  (Kant  as  an  example  of  the  dogmatic  image  of 
thinking). This is why, for Deleuze, the plan and the problematics 
of every authors, the produced oppositions or alliances are unique. 
The Deleuzian investigation may suppose both an interpretation 
and construction procedure and a neuter action of ‘parceling out’ 
and deconstruction, as can be seen in his reading of Kant.6  
(d)  The  situation  is  completely  different  in  his  work  on 
Bergson’s philosophy. Perhaps that is the reason behind the title 
of this work – Bergsonism. “The notion of difference promises to 
throw  light  on  the  philosophy  of  Bergson,  and  inversely, 
Bergsonism  promises  to  make  an  inestimable  contribution  to  a 
philosophy of difference.” (Deleuze 2004, 32) The strategy of this 
work can be, in turn, traced back to the Deleuzian interpretation 
and construction method, only that, in this case, Deleuze focuses 
on  the  problematic  lines  emerging  from  what  is  to  become  a 
Bergsonian ‘tradition’. Concepts as ‘multiplicity’, ‘virtuality’ are to 
be thrown upon the swarming relentless world and recovered as  
evanescent nets of experience (that condition no more than that 
are conditioning in contrast with the a priori schemes) making 
visible par example the concrete cadence of time as the books on 
Cinema  have  showed.  This  is  the  sense  in  which,  and  as  a 
consequence of which I can understand the Bergsonian ubiquity in 
the explanatory positions of many Deleuzian themes. 
In conclusion the hermeneutical spin proper to Deleuze’s 
own way of making philosophy is not based on a vulgar or savage 
utilization  of  texts,  concepts,  distinction  aiming  to  reach  by  all 
means a postmodern relativistic view on whatever is looking at. 
On the contrary we are dealing with a very ‘serious’ (as Foucault 
has  labeled  him)  undertake  in  philosophy  constructing  within META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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philosophy  with  the  reach  material  of  tradition  the  virtual 
structure of what it is that make as to do what we do ‘now’.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1  This  term  is  coined  as  a  terminal  overview  in  the  first  section  of  What  is 
Philosophy? on the manner in which philosophy makes shifts in the problematic 
jumps taken from an author to another (subject of Descartes and the subject of 
Spinoza or Kant for example). Furthermore if What is philosophy? is leveraged by 
a personal investigation of Deleuze regarding his one way of  making philosophy, 
then the sketch of the hermeneutical spin we are trying to draw could be justified 
by the mega-theme of philosophy as such put in to act in this final book. Guattari 
is not excluded although the book mention is co-written, just an-present in respect 
to the lines that are ‘fished’ from the creative pool of Deleuze first period that 
stretches from the book on Hume till the Logic of sense.     
2  “It  was  Nietzsche,  who  I  read  only  later,  who  extricated  me  from  all  this. 
Because you just can't deal with him in the same sort of way. He gets up to all 
sorts of things behind your back.” (Deleuze 1995, 6) This phrase of Deleuze bears 
special awakeners because it is hard to understand why Nietzsche is put in the 
‘later’ list of authors ‘dwelt’ with since his book on Nietzsche is his second official 
book. We can understand this sentence if we presume that he wrote the other 
books (or some of them, Bergsonism for example) before that of Nietzsche and the 
order  of  publishing  is  just  unimportant  irrelevant  or  that  is  affirming  the 
difficulties encompassed by his ‘strategy’ (that we are trying to sketch) and that 
the resistance of Nietzsche has made his ‘capture apparatus’ a more sophisticated, 
evolved philosophical parasite in the body of philosophy.       
3 In the book dedicated to Nietzsche’s philosophy we pursue the structural sphere 
of constructivism in respect to the concepts of force, will to power and the element 
that  is  correlated  with  them  –  quality.  The  non-philosophical  embodiments 
present  in  those  concepts  (biology,  thermo-dynamics)  due  to  Nietzsche  one 
strategy  is  re-dimensioned  by  Deleuze  in  the  struggle  against  Hegelianism. 
Deleuze is shadowing Nietzsche’s philosophy in the light of Salomon Maimon’s 
project that is mainly constructed in regard to Kant’s transcendental philosophy, 
thus we have a Nietzsche that passes (in the figural and literal sense) over Hegel 
to restate the stakes of post-Kantianism’s and in an opening way to solve them. 
The sphere of interpretation is basically that with which Deleuze is in the first 
sits  of  Nietzsche  exegesis,  a  systematic  approach  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  (a 
coherent explication of the relation between force and will to power with all its 
implications).      
4 We must not forget that Deleuze is assembling various facts from let’s simply 
say non-philosophical domains as literature, art, biology etc.  as support for a 
philosophical thesis (the virtual for example).  
5  Zourabichvili  speaks  of  an  “unconventional  usage  of  indirect  speech”  in 
Deleuze’s book on other authors (Zourabichvili 2004, 14). I would say that Deleuze 
relates  only  to  what  can  his  procedure  retain  and  not  "the  story"  itself  of  an 
author;  electivity  holds  similar  to  the  manner  we  chose  our  friends,  basically 
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regarding personal traits and pure resonance. “Whether they're real or imaginary, 
animate or inanimate, you have to form your mediators. It's a series. If you're not 
in some series, even a completely imaginary one, you're lost. I need my mediators 
to express myself, and they'd never express themselves without me: you're always 
working in a group, even when you seem to be on your own.” (Deleuze 1995, 125) 
The  cause  of  this  rhetorical  ‘echoes’  through  others  is  based  first  of  all  on  a 
common cause (critique of transcendence, or ego for example) and in relation to 
our sketch by the very own procedure of Deleuze ‘method’ of philosophizing.     
6 “My book on Kant's different; I like it, I did it as a book about an enemy that 
tries to show how his system works, its various cogs - the tribunal of Reason, the 
legitimate exercise of the faculties (our subjection to  these made all the more 
hypocritical by our being characterized as legislators).” (Deleuze 1995, 6) Perhaps 
this is why in What is Philosophy? Deleuze will present a graphic sketch of how 
the subject circumscribed to the rigors of Kantian works. (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994, 56). 
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